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INTRODUCTION 
What is the ultimate goal at whial;l the vvill of every 
areature aims? Perhaps this has been the most important· ques-
tion that has perplexed the thinkers of all ages. It is 
aommonly aaaepted that every human aat is done for some end. 
The perennial problem is to determine what is the true end 
of life's aation. Our answer to this question is basia. It 
will largely determine our answer to many of the ~uestions 
that aonsti tute the provinee',of philosophy, suah as, ~Jhat is 
man? wihenae is he? Whither is he going? How shall he guide 
himself? Vfuat is the purpose of this vast and varied universe 
around him? What is man's relation to it and to the great 
Power behind the veil? Wha·t are man's duties to himself and 
to his fellow-men? What are his destinies? 
Laatantius reaognized that the intelleatual aonstitution 
of man compels him to inquire as to the true end of life. In 
this thesis I have end~avoured to ascertain the end of life 
as found in the extant writings of Laatantius. My studies 
have been based on the works of Laatantius, as translated by 
William Fletaher, and found in Volume VII of the .Ante-
Niaene Fathers. 
By the very nature of his writings, I have been com-
pelled to base my findings largely on the Divine Institutes, 
especially Books III, IV, and VII. 
Lactantius assigns his motive for writing the 
Institutes to the following: 
"Since the truth lies veiled in obscurity; 
and it is either an object of contempt to the 
learned because it has not had suitable defend-
ers, or it is hated by the unlearned on account 
of its natural severity, which the nature of men 
inclined to vices cannot endure ••.•••.• r have 
believed that these erros should be encountered, 
that both the learned may be directed to true 
wisdom and the unlearned to true religion.n 1. 
Lactantius has always held a very high place among the 
Christian Fathers, not only on account of the varied subject-
matter of his writings, but also on account of the erudition, 
the sweetness of ex~ression, and the grace and elegance of 
2. 
style, by which they are characterizied. 
' 
Chapter II 
The Life of Lactantius 
It is strange, therefore, that so little is known with 
certainty in regard to his personal history. It is difficult 
to fix with precision either the time or place of his binth, 
1. 
and even his name has been the subject of much discussion. 
It is known that Lactantius pursued his studies in the school 
of the celebrated rhetorician and apologist, Arnobius of 
2. 
Sicca in proconsular Africa. Hence, it has been supposed 
3. 4. 
that Lactantius was a native of Africa. Others have 
maintained that he was born in Italy, and that his birth-
Dlace was probably Firmium. It is generally accepted that 
5. 
he was born about the middle of the third century. 
Lactantius attained great eminence as a teacher of 
rhetoric, and when the Emperor Diocletian heard of his 
celebrity, he invited Lactantius to setLle at Nicomedia and 
7. 6. 
there practice his art. It has been observed that 
since Diocletian took up his permanent residence at 
Nicomedia in A.D. 28b, the call of Lactantius thither was 
probably not much later than that date. 
The city of Nicomedia was inhabited mainly by Greeks, 
and Lactantius found few pupils to instruct. St. Jerome 
says that this afforded Lactantius a great deal of 
leisure and he welcomed it as an opportunity to devote 
8. 
himself to author~~ip. 
It is chiefly through his writings that Lactantius 
is known. The works which have oome down to our day are 
mostly religious treatises of a philosophical character, 
the aim of which was nto sap the foundations of the heathen 
religion then prevalent in the Roman Empire, and to vindi-
9. 
cate the religion of Christ.n 
The following works are the ~roduot of his pen: 
10. 
~he_yivine Institutes, his most important work, is an ex-
haustive philosophic work in seven books; On the ~lorkman-
shin of God, a discussion of the creation and nature of 
--------
man; On the lmger of God, deals vvith the current theories 
of Providence; and On the Manner in ,;hioh the Persecutors 
Died, a violent treatise on the perseuctions from Nero 
-- 11. 
to Galerius. . There are also ascribed to him some 
12. 
writings which have been lost. Even now, howeveP, 
Lactantius is extant in two hundred 8nd twenty manuscripts, 
the oldest of which belong to the sixth and seventh cen-
14. 
turies. 
The style of. Lactantius has been deservedly praised 
for the dignity, elegance, and clearness of expression by 
which it is characterized, and VJhich have gained for him 
lb. 
the appellation of the Christian Cicero. His writings 
are always lucid and well arranged. Nowhere does 
13. 
the reader feel an unplesant tone of pedantry nor affectation; 
everywhere he is attracted by the impress oi genuine learning 
16. 
and eloquence. 
His reading was evidently very extensive, particular-
ly of authors, both in prose and poetry, in whose works the 
current moral and religious principles were presented. To 
such authors he refers with much copiousness and facility 
...,. 
and turns them to account, by shovJing their agreement with 
17. 
his own views, or by exposing their errors. However, some 
do not think much of his Biblical and theological erudition. 
It was probably during the time Lactantius was teach-
lB. 
ing at Xicomedia that he embraced the Christian faith. 
i~o doubt witnessing the superhuman constancy displayed by 
19. 
the Christians of that city influenced him greatly. This 
was a period when Christians were being persecuted by the 
emperors with fire and sword. They were also assailed by 
heathen philosouhers with the weapons of science, wit, and 
20. 
ridicule. 
It has been a matter of perplexity to understand how 
Lactantius escaped personal injury durinF, the severe 
21. 
Jiocletian persecution. Some think, and this seems 
reasonable, that it was because he was generally regarded 
as a philosopher, and not a Christian writer. To judge 
22. 
from some of his writings he appears to have been more 
attracted by the moral and philosophical aspects of Christ-
ianity than by the supernatural and dogmatic. In fact, in 
all the theological works of Lactantius is manifest the 
influence of his early studies of all the masterpieces of 
23. 
ancient rhetoric and philosophy. In the words of Jerome, 
24. 
he was "omnium suo tempore eruditissimus". 
About A.D. 315 Lactantius was called to settle in Gaul 
and the Emperor Constantine entrusted to him the education 
25. 
of his son, Crispus. In the language of Gibbon, 
nr,actant ius, the most elo,~uent of the Christians n was 
"admirably qualified to ~orm the taste, and to excite the 
26. 
virtues, of his illustrious disciple." 
It is commonly accepted that Lactantius died at Treves 
about A.D. 325. 
Chapter III 
Introduction to Moral Philoscinhy 
Lactantius begins his philosophical discussion in the 
third book of the Divine Institut~, entitled, Of The False 
\lisdom of the Philoso.E_hers. Here he enters into conflict 
with the philosophers and endeavors to expose the vanity of 
their pretansions. He introduces us to his purpose by 
asserting, "For since all eror arises_either fro~ false 
religion or from wisdom (philosophy falsely so-called), in 
1. 
refuting error it is necessary to overthrow both." 
He continues by saying, 11There is no reason why we 
should give so much honor to philosophers ••••• for they might 
speak well as men of learning; but they could not speak truly 
because they have not learned the truth from him inw whose 
power it vJas. Nor indeed shall we effect anything great in 
convincing them of their ignorance, which they themselves 
very often confess. Since they are not believed in that 
one point alone in ·VJhich alone they ought to have been 
believed, I will endeavor to show that they never spoke so 
truly as when they uttered their opinion respecting their 
2. 
own ignorance." 
In the Preface, Lactantius tells us that he is now 
engaged in a profession which is 11much better, more useful 
and glorious", than that of oratory in which he had long 
3. 
been engaged. He says to impart the knowledge of speaking 
well is deserving of respect, but how much more, he who 
teaches men to live in piety and innocence. For this reason 
the philosophers had greater elory than the arators among 
the Greeks; because philosophers were considered theachers 
of right livint;, which is far more excellent, since to speak 
well belongs merely to a few, but to live well relates to 
4. 
all. However, Lactantius, admits that oratory has been 
of advantage to him because now he can plead the cause of 
truth with great facility. The truth may be defended with-
out eloquence, and many have done so; yet it should be given 
the aid of rhetoric, so that it will influence minds more 
deeply, not. by its own force alone, but by the light of 
5. 
cult iva ted speech ·which illumines it. 
Lactanti11s observes that if some of the greatest 
orators retiring from the strife of the courts betook them-
selves to philosophy, hoping to find in it a respite which 
they did not find, then "how much more justly shall I 
betake myself as to a most safe barbour, to that pious, true, 
and divine wisdom, in which all thin~s are ready for utter-
ance, pleasant to the hearing, easy to be understood, honor-
6. 
able to be undertaken." Ahd if some arbiters of justice 
published Institutions of civil law for the purpose of 
straightening contentions between discordant citizens, then 
it is much better and even more proper to write the Divine 
Institutions, whose purpose is to speak on weightier matters 
~-·---------------------------------------------------------------------~~· 
of "hope, of life, of salvation, of immortality, and of God." 
In the openinb of Book Two, Lactantius, addressing 
himself to the Emperor Constantine, says, that he desires to 
undertake the useful and greater duty of recalling men from 
crooked paths and of bringing them into favor with them-
selves, so that they will not think that man is born in 
8. 
vain, as some philosophers teach. 
Lactantius says the in_uiry after truth is natural to 
all, but many deprive themselves of wisdom because they 
accept parrot-fashion the thinking of the ancestors without 
any .iudgment of their own; hence they are led by others 
like sheep. ";fuat, therefore, prev~nts us from taking 
such a precedent from them," says Lactantius, "That as they 
handed down to posterity their false inventions, so we who 
have discovered the truth may hand down better things to 
9. 
our posterity?n 
In the opening of the Third Book, Lactantius expresses 
a desire that the power of eloquence had fallen to his lot, 
that truth, supported by talent as well as by its own force, 
might refute error and introduce among the human race a 
10. 
brilliant light. A little lt~ter he admits that "I bear 
it vvi th equanimity that a moderate degree of talent has been 
11. 
granted to me". However, he asserts that it is not in 
reliance upon eloquence, but upon the truth, that this work 
12. 
is undertaken. Ee says that is a work perhaps too great 
7. 
for his human strength; but even if he fail "the truth 
itself will complete, with the aid of God, whose office 
13. 
this is." Lactantius felt that this was no small task 
and he expected to put his best into it. He says that he 
never came to pleading causes in public, indicating that 
this was due to what he calls his lack of eloquence; though 
he urges that in speaking of the end of life, the goodness 
14. 
of this cause must make him eloquent. .And in the 
conclusion of his work on the Workmanshi.r_. of God, I1actantius 
lays bear his heart and earnestly asks, "Shall we suffer 
the truth to be extinguished or crushed," He states that 
he is determined to commit to writing as much as possible 
15. 
which has any bearing on the happy life. He tells us 
that he wishes to live for no other reason than that he 
might effect something worthy of lil'e and useful to his 
readers. And when he has accomplished this, Lactantius 
says that he will have lived enough and discharged his duty 
if his labor shall have "freed some men from errors, and 
16. 
have directed them to the path which leads to heaven." 
So much for the ~urpose which motivated Lactantius 
in VJriting the Divine Institute~. He observes that the 
etymology of the word .:philoso.phy indicates not the possess-
ion of wisdom, but a striving after it; and in its ultimate 
... v. 
result it leaves us nothing but mere opinion ~nd uncertainty. 
He says, "They who apply themselves to philosophy do not 
r-------------------, 
devote themselves to the :pursuit of wisdom, but they imagine 
that they do so, because they know not where that is which 
they are searching for or of what character it is ••••• It is 
17. 
either sought in an improper manner, or not sollght at all." 
Lactantills then proceeds to note the want of agreement 
amon~,: the various philosophers. He points out that they are 
18 
divided tnto many sects and all entertain various sentiments, 
and asks the question, "In which do we place the truth? It 
19. 
certainly cannot be in all." 
Some :9hiloso]lhers clain knov;ledge and others deny it. 
Lactantius says, "Between these two kinds of philosophy I 
see that there is disagreement, and as it were, civil war. 
On which eide shall we place wisdom, which cannot be torn 
20. 
asunder?" ARain he asks, "Does wisdom nowhere exist? 
21. 
Yes indeed. It was amongst them, but no one saw it." 
After show in"~ that philosophy is groundless a·s a trllst-
worthy criterion, Lactantius passes to the subject of moral 
I;Jhilosophy and the chief good. Iiere he distinguishes natural 
I;Jhilosophy from moral philosophy. In natural philosophy there 
is only delip,ht; in moral philosophy there is utility also. 
It is more dangerous to commit a fault in arranging the 
condition of life and informing the character. Hence, the 
great diligence must be used that we may know how vJe ought 
to live. In natural philosophy some ind~lgence may be granted 
for it does no permanent injury, but in moral l)hilosophy, 
nthere is no room for difference of opinion nor error. All 
must entertain the same sentiments, and philosophy itself 
must give instruction as it were with one mouth; because if 
2' 
any error shall be committed, lil'e is altogether overthrown." 
asks, 
Lactantius then carries the inquiry still further and 
23. 
HI,et us see whether they {the philosophers) 
agree or what assistance they give us for the 
better guidance of life •••• Let us select one 
and especially that which is the chief end 
principal thing (the true end of life) in which 
the whole of wisdom centers and depends.n 
r~--------------~----~ 
Chapter IV 
The End of Life in the HistorJ[ 
of Philo.so;ehy 
~Vhat has been the chief good or the end of life in 
the history of philosophy? Lactantius answers this ~uestion 
quite briefly, and says that Epicurus deemed the chief good 
to consist in pleasure of the mind, while for Aristippus 
1. 
the end of life was pleasure of the body. 
Diodorus united virtue with the privation of.pain, 
2. 
while Callipho and Dinomachus connected it with pleasure. 
In what did Hieronymus place the chief cood? 
3. 
Iactantius says that it was in the absence of pain. 
The Peripatetics differ in their conception of the 
end of life and place it in the goods of the mind, the body, 
4. 
and of fortune. 
The chief good of Herillus, according to Lactantius, 
5. 
is knowledge. 
For Zeno, the end of life was to live agreeably to 
6. 
nature. 
Lactantius indicates that certain Stoics said the 
7. 
chief good was to follow virtue. 
The last to be mentioned is Aristotle, and Lactantius 
accounts him as placing the end of life in integrity and 
8. 
virtue. 
Lactantius is of the opinion that the system of 
r- 14. Epicurus was more generally followed than that of any of the 
9. 
other philosophers; not because it brings forward any 
truth, but because the attractive name of pleasure invites 
10. 
many. He further accounts for Epicurus' success by say-
11. 
ina: that every one is naturally inclined to vices. 
He attempts to show how the philosophy of Epicurus 
wins acceptance because the latter adapts his teachings to 
the likes of every man: 
"Moreover, for the purpose of drawing the 
multitude to himself, he {Epicurus) speaks that 
which is specially adapted to each character 
separately. He forbids the idle to apply him-
self to learninG; he releases the covetous 
man from giving largesses to the people; he 
prohibits the inactive mun from undertaking 
the business of the state, the sluggish fro~ 
bodily exercise, the timid from military ser-
vice. ~he irreligious is told that the gods 
pay no attention to the conduct of men; the 
man who is unfeeling and selfish is ordered 
to give nothing to any one, for that the wise 
man does everything on his own account. To 
a man who avoids the crowd, solitude is 
praised. One who is too sparing learns 
that life can be sustained on water and 
meal. If a man hates his wife, the bless-
ings of celibacy are enumerated to him; 
to one who has bad children, the happiness 
of those who are without children is pro-
claimed; against unnatural parents it is 
said that there is no bond of nature. 
To the man who is delicate and incapable 
of endurance, it is 3aid that pain is the 
greatest of all evils; to the man of forti-
tude, it is said that the wise man is happy 
even under tortures. The man who devotes 
himself to the pursuit of influence and 
distinction is enjoined to pay court to 
kings; he who cannot endure annoyance is 
enjo)"ned to shun the abode of kings. Thus 
the crafty man collects an assembly from 
various and differing characters; and while 
r--------------------------------~ 
he lays himself out to please all, he is more 
at variance with himself than they all are 
with one another." 12. 
Laotantius, however, does not want his readers to read 
this criticism without understanding in a measure at least, 
the background and origin of' the system of Epicurus. He 
13. 
relates how that ~picurus saw that the good are often 
subject to adversities, poverty, labors, exile, and loss of 
dear friends. On the other hand, he saw that the wicked were 
happy, they had influence, and were loaded with honors. 
Epicurus saw that ·innocence v~as unprotected, that crimes 
were committed without punishment. He realized that death 
waged without regard to character, without any discrimation 
of age. That which especially moved him, says Lactantius, 
was the fact that "religious men were especially visited 
with weightier evils, whereas he saw that lesser evils or 
none at all fell u~on those who altogether neglected the 
14. 
gods, or worshipped them in an impious manner." 
"There :tore," rem arks Lactant ius, 11 When Epicurus 
reflected on these thin~s, induced as it were by the in-
justice of these matters (for thus it appeared to him in 
his ~gnorance of the cause and subject), he thought that 
there was no providence. And havin~ persuaded himself' of 
this, he undertook also to defend it, and thus he entangled 
15. 
himself in inextricable errors." 
After 1uite a lengthy discussion of the consequences 
r 
16. 
of Epicurus 1 denial of providence, Lactantius points out 
that as a result of the false principles at the beginning 
of his system, he ended up as an "advocate of most dis-
graceful pleasure, and said that man was born for its 
17. 
enjoyment. 11 
If it were true that man was born for the enjoyment 
of disgraceful pleasure, Lactantius points out the aonse-
quenaes of such belief and indicates what bearing it 
would have on a man's life and end. If there were no 
providence and no immortality why should man avoid vice 
in this life. It would inevitably lead to the indulgence 
of pleasure in every conceivable manner; and why not, 
if God does not care and in a short time death will end 
all? 
"Who, when he hears this affirmed, would 
abstain from the practice of viae and wicked-
ness? For if the soul is doomed to perish, 
let us eagerly puruse riches, that we may be 
able to enjoy all kinds of indulgence; and if 
these are wanting to us, let us take them 
away from those who have by stealth, by 
stratagem, or by f'orae, especially if there 
is no God who regards the actions of men: 
as long as the hope of impunity shall 
favour us, let us plunder, and put to 
death. For it is the part of the wise 
man to do evil, if it is advantageous to 
him, and safe; since, if there is a God in 
heaven, Ee is not angry with any one. It 
is also equally the part of the foolish man 
to do good; because, as he is not excited 
with anger, so he is not influenced by 
favour. Therefore, let us live in the 
indulgence of pleasures in every possible 
way; for in a short time we shall not 
exist at all. Therefore, let us suffer 
no day, in short, no moment of life, to pass 
away from us without pleasure; lest, since 
v;e our selves are doomed to perish, the life 
which we have already spent Bhould itself 
also perish." 18. 
Lactantius suggests that Epicurus does not say these 
191 
things in word, but he does teach them in fact. He 
continues by sayinp that when Epicurus maintains that 
the men of wisdom does everythin~ for his own sake, that 
he really refers all his actions to his own advantage. 
If any one accepts this philosophy 11 he Vi ill neither 
think that any {~ood ought to be done, since the conferring 
of benefits has reference to the advantage of another; 
nor that he ought to abstain from guilt, because the 
20. 
doing of evil is attended with gain." 
The criticism is carried even i'urther v~hen 
Lactantius suggests that if a leader of pirates or robbers 
were urging his men to deeds of violence what better 
suited language could he use than that of Epicurus, which 
he enumerates as follows: 
"That the gods take no notice; that they 
are not affected with anger nor kind feelings; 
that the punishment of a f'uture state is not 
to be dreaded, because souls die after death, 
and that there is no future stste of nnish-
ment at all; that pleasure is the greatest 
good; that there is no society among men; 
that every one consults his own interext; 
that there is no one who loves another, 
unless it be for his own sake; that death 
is not to be feared by a brave man, nor 
any pain; for that he, even if he should 
be tormented and burned, should say that 
21. 
he does not regard it." 
22. 
In another work, Lactantius says that Epicurus 
maintained that the end or li;e was pleasure of the soul, 
and criticizes it by saying, 
11What is pleasure of the soul but ,joy, 
in which the soul for the most part luxur-
iates, and unbends itself either to sport 
or to laughter? But this good befalls even 
dumb animals, which, when they are satisfied 
with pasture, relax themselves to joy and 
wantonness.n 23. 
Concerning 1\risti_p~;us, the founder of the Cyrenaic 
sect, who thought that bodily pleasure was the end of life, 
Lactantius says, that he "ought to be removed from the 
number of philosophers and from the society of men, be-
24. 
cause he· compared himself to a beast. n 
Lactantius also writes the following bitter criticism: 
"I do not consider .Aristi_piJUS even worthy 
of an answer; for since he is always rushing in-
to pleasures of the body, and is only the slave 
of sensual indulgences, no one can regard him 
as a man; for he lived in such a m~nner that 
there was no difference between him and a 
brute, except this only, that he had the facul-
ty of speech •••• Shall we then seek precepts 
of living from these men, who have no other 
feelin~s than those of the irrational crea-
tures?" 25. 
,If we follow such a one, Lactantius feels that we 
must contend that virtue is to be rraised in accordance 
with its capacity of yielding pleasure. Shall we therefore 
seek wisdom from those who evince not the least possession 
of it, who differ from cattle and brutes, not in feeling, 
26. 
but in language? 
In criticizing the end of life of Dinomachus and 
Callipho, who a~~roved of honourable pleasure, Lactantius 
briefly says, that "they either said the same that 
Epicurus did, that 1Jodily pleasure is dishonoll.rable; or 
if they considered bodily nleasll.res to be ~artly base and 
]_')Hrtl,y honourable, then t; hat is not the chief good which 
27. 
is ascribed to the body. 11 
Concerning Hieronymus who held the end of life to be 
without pain, and Diodorus who said it was to cease to be 
28. 
in pain, Lactantius sa~rs, 
"Rllt the other animals avoid pain, and 
when they are without pain, or cease to be 
in pain, are glad. ~hat distinction, then, 
shall be given to man, if his chief good 
is judged to be common with the beasts?" 29. 
The Peripatetics said that the true end of life con-
30. 
sisted of the goods of the soul, the body, and of fortll.ne. 
In regard to their philosophy, Lactantill.S says, 
"The goods of the soul may be approved 
of; but if they require assistance for the 
completion of happiness, they are plainly 
weak. But the goods of the body and of 
fortune are not in the power of man; nor 
is that now the chief good which is assign-
ed to the body, or to thin~s placed without 
us, because this double good extends even 
to the cattle which have need of being 
well, and of a due supply of food." 31. 
The Pyrrhonist, Ilerillus, held knowledge to be the 
32. 
true end of life, and Lactantill.S agrees that this good 
belongs to man, and to the soul only, bll.t it may happen to 
r -. --h-1.-. m_w_i_t_h_o_u_t_v_i_r_t_u_e-. -3-3-.--H-e_r_e_a_s_o_n_s_t_h_a_t_a_p_e_r_s_o_n __ w_h_o_h_a_s ___ ..,zt 
~ 
either learned anything by hearing or reading is not to be 
considered happy. Nor is it a definition of the true end 
of life because there may be knowledge of either bad things, 
or even useless things. But even if we have acquired know-
ledge of good and useful things by labour, still it is not 
the true end of life beca11se knovvledge is not to be sought 
on its own account, but on account of something else. 
Lactantius then gives an examnle and says that the arts are 
learned either to be means of sUp1Jort, or a source of gloiY, 
or even of pleasure; and it is plan that these thincs can-
34. 
not be the end of life. 
35. 
In one place, Lactantius criticizes the end of life 
in 2eno as beinc a very general one because all animals 
live agreeably to nature, and each has it own nature. In 
the Divine Institutes, however, he is more explicit: 
"Let us also hear Zeno, for he at times 
dreams of virtue. The chief good, he says, is 
to live in accordance with nature. Therefore 
we m~st live after the manner of the brutes. 
For in these are found all the things which 
ought to be absent from man: they are eager 
for pleasures, they fear, they deceive, they 
lie in wait, they kill; and that which is 
especially to the point, they have no know-
ledge of God. Why, therefore, does he teach 
me to live according to nature, which is of 
itself prone to a worse course, and under 
the influence of some more soothing bland-
ishments plunges headlong into vices? Or 
if he says that the nature of brutes is 
different from the nature of man, because 
man is born to virtue, he says something to 
the purpose; but, however, it will not be 
a definition of the chief good, because 
there is no animal ~hich does not live in 
accordance with its nature." 36. 
Lactantius makes rather brief mention of the Stoics 
in his criticism of their end of life. He says that it is 
usually thought that the Stoics have entertained much 
better views and held that virtue was the true end of life. 
"But," says Lactantius, "Virtue cannot be the chief good, 
since if it is the endurance of evils and of labours, 
it is not happy of itself; but it ouzht to effect and pro-
duce the chief good, because it cannot be attained Yvi thout 
37. 
the greatest difficulty and labour." 
Concerning Aristotle, even, Lactantius doesn't have 
a very sympathetic spirit as is evidence.d by these ·words: 
"In truth, Aristotle wandered far from 
reason, who connected honour with virtue, as 
though it were possible for virtue at any 
time to be separated from honour, or to be 
united with baseness." 38. 
Lactantius enlarges a little more upon his criticism 
by saying in this connection, 
"But he (that is, Aristotle) saw that it 
might happen that a bad opinion is entertained 
respecting virtue by a depraved judgment, and 
therefore he thought that deference should be 
naid to what in the estimation of men consti-
~utes a departure from what is right and good, 
becauwe it is not in our pov;er that virtue 
shculd be honoured simply for its own deserts. 
For what is honourable character, except per-
petual honour, conferred on any one by the 
favourable renort of the peoole? What, then, 
will hap!)en, if through the error· and perverse-
ness of men a bad reputation should ensue? 
Shall we cast aside virtue because it is 
judged to be base and disgraceful by the 
foolish? And since it is capable of being 
oppressed and harrassed, in order that it may 
be of itself a peculiar and lasting good, it 
ought to stand in need of no outward assist-
ance, so as not to depend by itself upon its 
own strength, and to remain steadfast. Ahd 
thus no good is to be hoped by it from man, 
nor is any evil to be refused." 39 • 
.And in summing u_p his criticism of' the end of life in 
these various philoso~hers, Lactantius remarks, 
"Therefore the philosophers do not observe 
the rule even in moral philosophy, inasmuch as 
they are at variance with one another on the 
main point itself, that is, in that discussion 
by which the life is moulded. For the precepts 
cannot be e~ual, or resembling one another, 
when some train men to pleasure, others to 
honour, others indeed to nature, others to 
knowledge; some to the pursuit, others to the 
avoiding of riches; some to entire insensibil-
ity to pain, others ~o the endurance of evils; 
in all which, as I have shown before, they 
turn aside from reason, because they are ig-
norant of God." 40. 
Why was there all this difference of opinion among 
these men of wisdom? Lactantius a2cribes it to the follow-
inp;: 
"This ~as especially the cause of all 
the errors of the philosophers, that they 
did not comprehend the system of the world, 
which com:9rises the ~:;hole of wisdom. But 
it cannot be comprehended by our own per-
ception and innate intelligence, which 
they wished to do by themselves without a 
teacher. Therefore they fell into various 
and ofttimes contradictory opinions, out 
of which they had no way of escape, 
And they remained fixed in the same mire, 
as the cosmic writer says, since their conclu-
sion does not correspond v;ith their assump-
tions; inasmuch as they assu~ed things to be 
true which could not be affirmed, and proved 
41. 
without the kno~ledge of the ~rnth and of 
heavenly things ••••• Man cannot attain this 
knowledge by reflection or disputation, but 
by learning and hearing from Him who alone 
is able to know and to teach." 42. 
In lilioking back over the things he had said concern-
ing the end of life in all of these philosophers, Lactan-
tius seems to be solilonuizing when he says, 
"I wonder, therefore, that there was 
none at all of t :-:e philo so :nhers who discov-
ered the abode and dwellin~-place of the 
chief good. ?or they mip;ht have sout_::ht it 
in this manner. ,;hatever the greatest good 
is, it must be an object Droposed to all 
men. rrhere is !1le a sure, which is de sired 
by all; but this is common also to man 
with the beasts, and has not the force 
of the honourable, and brings a feeling 
of satiety, and when it is in excess is 
injurious, and it ie lessened by advance 
of age, and does not fall to the lot of 
many: for they who are without resources, 
who constitute the greater part or men, 
must also be vJi thout pleasure. Therefore 
pleasure is not the true chief good; but 
it is not even a good." 43. 
In reeard to riches, he says in relation to his re-
marks above, concerning pleasure, 
"This is much more true of them. For 
they fall to the lot of fewer men, and that 
generally by chance; and they oft~n fall to 
the indolent, and sometimes by guilt, and 
they are desired by those who already 
possess them." 44. 
And in regard to sovereignty, Lactantius remarks, 
"That odes not constitute the chief good: for all cannot 
reign, but it is necessary that all should be capable of 
45. 
attaining the chief good." 
In.concluding this cha])ter I feel it well worth VJhile 
to be this rather lengthy citation from the Div~~e_Institutes 
becAuse it up pears that Lactant ius thinks that perh~1ps some 
of his readers may have become weary of his criticism of the 
end of life in all of these philosophies; some may even 
des~air of arriving at the correct solution of the true end. 
To counteract this, he suggests that now, after denying 
the validity of all these others, let us seek something 
held forth to all. He says we should not despair of being 
able to find the true end of life, and urges his readers 
to remember that -Ghis is a matter of no small :1.: 1portance. 
"Let us seek something therefore which 
is held forth to all. Is it virtue? It 
cannot be denied that v:i.rtue is a good, and 
undoubtedly a good for all men. But if it 
cannot be ah~py because its power and 
nature consist in the endurance of evil, 
it assuredly is not the chief good ••••• 
But YJhat shall we say that it is? Pleasure? 
But nothing that is base can arise from 
that which is honourable. :hall we say 
that it is riches? or commands? But 
these thin~s are frail snd uncertain. 
It is glory? or honour? or a lasting 
name? But all these things are not con-
tained in virtue itself, but depend upon 
the opinion and ,iucigment of others •••••• 
;fuy should I SGY that the duties or vir-
tue consi~t in the despising of all these 
things? For not to long for, or desire, 
or love pleasures, riches, dominions, 
and honours, and all those things which 
are esteemed as goods, as others do over-
powered by desire, that assuredly is 
virtue. Therefore it effects something 
else more sublime and excellent; nor 
does anything struggle against these 
present goods but that which longs for greater 
and truer things. Let us not despair of being 
able to find it, if we turn our thoughts in 
all directions; for no sli~.;;:ht or tr if lin~~:; 
re-.iards are sOUi~ht. n 46. 
Chapter V 
PrinciJ?les By \'ih~_ch to Determine the 
True End of Life 
After examining and setting aside the conflicting 
notions of the philosophers on the end of life, Lactantius 
then well asks, "In such a difference of opini0ns, whom do 
1. 
we follow? 7/hom do we believe'? 11 
He sets himself to the task of giving some 9rinciples 
by which may be determined the true end of' life. He makes 
the preliminary remark that a true end of life should have 
reference to man alone. Since the inquiry is respecting 
the duty of man, and because man has a nature different from 
that of any other terrestrial creatures, his chief good must 
consist in something peculiar to himself, and this, which 
3. 
false wisdom has overlooked, true wisdom fully teaches." 
. 
The chief good of man should be placed in that which is 
peculiar to man, and which he does not have in common vJith 
other animals. 
rrsomething peculiar to himself ought to 
be attributed to man, without which he would 
lose the fixed order of his conditlon.- For 
that which is ~iven to all for the purpose of 
life or i~neration, is indeed a natural good; 
but still it is not the greatest, unless it 
be peculiar to each class." 4. 
The second principle that Lactantius suggests by which 
to determined the true e~-Q .. of life, is that it should belong 
b. 
peculiarly to the mind. 
w~ve are not born for this purpose, that 
we may see those things which are created, but 
that we may contemplate, that is, behold with 
our mind, the Creator of all things Himself." 6. 
The third and final principle by which to determine the 
true end of' life is that ·it cannot be attained without vii'-
7. 
tue. By the aid of these three ~rinci~les, Lactantius 
sho~s the futility of the philosopher's doctrines on the 
subject. He attacks them by assertin~ that their speech is 
8. 
at vBriance v1ith their lives, a~d ~uotes Seneca as saying, 
":Philosophy is nothing else than the rip;ht method of living, 
or the science of livinf honorably, or the art of passing a 
9. 
good life." Lactantius, however, is not satisfied with 
this definition and reasons that Seneca probably did not 
refer to the common name of philoeophy because there is 
nothing certain, nothing on which all agree as is evidenced 
by the many sects and systems; and therefore, what can be so 
false as to call philosophy the rule of life, since the very 
diversity of its precepts is an obstacle to right living 
10. 
and causes confusion. Lactantius says that philosophy 
renders "all things uncertain, abrogates law, esteems art as 
nothing, subverts method, distorts rule, entirely takes 
11. 
away knowledge." He says that there has been established 
"no Rystem, or science, or law of living well", except in 
the only true and heavenly wisdom, which was unknown to the 
nhilosophers. Earthly wisdom, since it is false, becomes 
varied and multiplied, and altogether opposed to itself. But 
as there is but one creator and ruler of the world, God, and 
as truth is one; so, Lactantius reasons, wisdom must also be 
simple and one, because, if anything is true and good, it 
12. 
cannot be perfect unless it is the only one of its kind. 
Sut, even if philosophy were able to form life, Lactantius 
points out that no others but philosochers v1ould be good, and 
all others who had not learned philosophy would be bad. He 
indicates that there ar•e, and always have been, innwnerable 
persons who are or have been good without learning, but it is 
13. 
seldom that we hear anything _praiseworthy of _:1hilosophers. 
He says, "Vfuo is there I pray, who does not see that those 
men are not teachers of virtue, of which they themselves are 
14. 
destitute?" 
To further strengthen his point, Lactantius quotes 
Tullius: 
""How few of nhilosonhers ere found of 
such A character, s; constituted in soul and 
life as reason demandsi How few are obedient 
to themselves, and submit to their own decrees! 
We may see some of such levity and ostentation, 
that it would be better for them not to have 
learned at all; others eagerly desirious of 
money, others of glory; many the slaves of 
lusts, so that their speech wonderfully dis-
agrees with their life." 15. 
Seneca is also r;uoted as follows: 
"Hany of the philosophers are of this 
description, eloruent to their own condemna-
tion: for if you should hear them arguing a-
gainst avarice, against lust and ambition, 
you would think that they were making a 
public disclosure ot their own character, 
so entirely do the censures which they utter 
in public flow back upon themselves." 16. 
In explainin~ the necessity of this third principle 
that the true end of life cannot be attained apart from virtue, 
Lectantius remarks, 
"But they who merely teach without act-
ing, of themselves detract from the weight of 
their own precepts; for who vJould obey, when 
they who give the precepts themselves teach 
disobedience? Moreover, it is a good thing 
to give right and honourable 0rece~ts; but 
unless you also practice them it is a deceit, 
and it is inconsistent wnd trifling to have 
goodness not in the heart, but on the lips. 11 17. 
Chapter VI 
The End ~~ ~ife A~oy_~~ng to Lactantius 
As a background to the statement of Lactantius' own 
noint of view in iegard to the true end of life, it mi~ht be 
well to eive the following: 
"And because the ohil£soDhers did not 
comprehend this main point, •they were neither 
able to comprehend truth, althou~~h they for 
the most part both saw and explained those 
things of which the main point itself con-
sists. But different persons urought for-
ward all these things, and in different ways, 
not connecting the causes of things, nor the 
consenuences, nor the reasons, so thst they 
mir~ht join together and complete Ghat main 
point which comprises the whole." 2. 
Did Lactantius overthrow philosophy as such? And did 
he think that the philosophers had none of the truth? 
"It is easy to show that almost the 
whole truth has been divided by philosophers 
and sects. ~or we do not overthrow philoso-
phy, as the Academics are accustomed to do, 
whose plan was to reply to everything, which 
is rather to calumniate and uock; but we show 
that no sect was so much out of the way, and 
no philosophy so vain, as not to see something 
of the truth. nut while they are made with 
the desire of contradicting, while they de-
fend their own arguments even though false, 
and overthrow those of others even though 
true, not only has the truth escaped from 
them, which they pretended that they were 
seeking, but they themselves lost it chief-
ly through their own fault. But if there 
had been any one to collect together the 
truth which was dispersed amongst individ-
uals and scattered amongst sects, and to 
reduce it to a body, he assuredly would not 
disagree with us. But no one is able to do 
this, unless he has experience, and know-
ledge of the truth. But to know the truth 
belongs to him only who has been taught of 
God." 3. 
~o. 
Let us endeavor to follow the reasoninF of Lactantius: 
"Therefore, leaving the authors of this 
earthly philosophy, who bring forward nothing 
certain, let us approach the right path; for 
if I considered these to be sufficiently 
suitable guides to a cood life, I would follow 
them myself, and exhort others to follow them. 
But since they disagree among one another 
·with great contention, and are for the most 
part at variance with themselves, it is 
evident that their path is by no means 
straightforward; since they have severally 
marked out distinct ways for themselves 
accordin~ to their own will, and have left 
great confusion to those who are seeking for 
the truth. But since the truth is revealed 
from heaven to us who have received the 
mystery of trlle religion, and since we follow 
God, the teacher of wisdom and the guide to 
truth, we call together all, without any 
distinction either of sex or age, to heaven-
ly pasture. For there is no more pleasant 
food fo:" the soul than the knowledge of the 
truth. 11 4. 
Lactantius feels that we must provide for these philos-
ophers who are groping in error, that they may not ficht 
against themselves, and that they may be willing at length 
5. 
to be freed from inveterste error. 
"And this they will assuredly do if 
they shall at any time see for what purpose 
they were born; for this is the cause of 
their perverseness, -- namely, ignorance 
of themselves: and if any one, having 
gained the knO\Jledge of the trLlth shall 
have shaken off this ignorance, he will 
kno'.; to whc.t object his life is to be 
directed, and how it is to be spent • 
.And I thlls briefly define the Sllm of this 
knowledge, that neither is any reli{~ion 
to be undertaken without wisdom, nor any 6. 
wisdom to be approved of without religion." 
Lactantius develops this thesis to its ultimate conclu-
t ~-----------------------------------------~ 
sion and rather elaborately defends the doctrine that, 
nThe one chief good, therefore, is 
immortality, 1'or the reception of which we 
were originally formed and born. To this 
we direct our course; human nature regards 
this; to this virtue exalts us.n 7. 
He thought that the arguments of Plato, although they 
contribute much to the subject of immortality, do little to 
nrove it, "since he had neither summed U}) and collected into 
one the plan of the whole of this great mystery, nor had he 
com_nrehended the chief good. For although he perceived the 
truth respecting immortality of the soul, yet he did not 
8. 
speak respecting it as though it were the chief good.n 
Man's immortality is believed by Christians, says 
Lactantius, on divine authority: 
11We therefore, are able to elicit the 
truth by more cert:c;in signs; for we have not 
collected it by doubtful surmise, but have 
known it by divine instruction.n 9. 
It is interesting to note, however, that Lactantius does 
not state the argument from divine testimony. After Dresent-
ing the chief heads of Plato's reasoning in favor of 
immortality, Lactantills mentions Pythagoras as also being 
of the same mind and says that Cicero re9orted him as the 
10. 
I'irst to discourse upon the immortality of the solll. Then 
11. 
other philosonhers who opposed the doctrine were cited. 
Finally Lactantills says that even Tullius declared he did not 
know what was the truth after considering all these opinions. 
He is quoted as saying, "Since each of these opinions had 
most learned defenders, it cannot be divined what is certain-
12. 
ty." But Lactantius observ~s that we have no need of 
divination, since "the divinity itself has laid 09en to us 
13. 
the truth." 
i1s 8 basis for his first argu;nent for immortality, 
Lactantius says that God is invisible, and yet if any one 
denied His existence, he would not only refuse to call such 
an one a philosopher, but would even deny him the name of 
a man. Furtherraore, God made many things. We see the power 
of their manifestations, but cannot bel:wld their subst~:mce. 
1J.l8ke for exam:ple: the voice, the wind, smell. Thus God is 
not to be perceived through the senses but through the eyes 
of the mind. 
nBefore all things, since God cannot 
be seen by man, lest nny one should ima~ine 
from this circumstance that God does not 
e±ist, because He was not seen by mortal 
eyes, among other wonderful arrangements 
He also made many things the power of 
which is manifest, but the substance is 
not seen, as the voice, smell, the wind, 
that by the token and exam~le of these 
things we might _perceive God from His 
9ower and operations and works, although 
He did not fall under the notice of our 
eyes •••••• God is not to be perceived by 
us through the sight or other frail 
sense; But He is to be beheld by the 
eyes of the mind, since we see His 
illustrious and wonderful works." 14. 
After a few remarks concerning philosophers who did not 
believe in the existence of God and therefore fell into 
15. 
absurdities which necessarily followed such a sentiment, 
Lactantius reasons that if there is a God who is invisible 
and likewise incorporeal and eternal, is it not reasonable 
that the soul also, although it is invisible, yet does not 
perish after its departure from the body. 
"But if there is a God who is incor-
poreal, invisible, and eternal, therefore 
it is credible that the soul, since it is 
not seen, does not perish after its de-
parture from the body; for its is mani-
fest that something exists which perceives 
and is vigorous, and yet does not come 
into si,zht. Bnt it is said, it is diffi-
cult to com~rehend with the mind howthe 
soul can retain its perception without 
those parts of the body in which the 
office of Derce}Jtion is contained. l'ihat 
about God? Is it easy to comprehend how 
He is vigorous without a body? But if 
they believe in the existence of gods 
who, if they exist, are plainly desti-
tute of bodies, it must be that human 
souls can exist in the same way, since 
it is rerceived from reason itself, and 
discernment, that there is in a certain 
resemblance in man and God." 16. 
A second proof which is urged for inwortality is that 
no other animal has any knowledge of God. Religion is 
~nrb1arily that which distinguishes man i'rom the dumb crea-
tion. And if this does distinguish man, Lactantius is of 
the opinion that it certainly points to the fact that our 
aim and desire is that which is to be familiar and near. 
"The immortality of the soul may be 
discerned from the fact that there is no 
v'Z• 
other animal which h~s any knowledge of 
God; and religion is almost the only 
thing which distinguishes man from the 
dumb creation. And since this falls 
to man alone, it assuredly testifies 
that we may aim at, desire, and culti-
vate that which is about to be famil-
iar and very near." 17. 
Somewhat in the s arne strain, ·~Je are reminded that man 
nlone of all animals is of the UDright position; he alone 
is divine. He goes in search of his ori~in, not carine 
for the earth, because he realizes that the highest good 
is to be searched in the highest place, and hence man looks 
towards his Maker. 
"Can any one, when has has consider-
ed the nature of other animals, which the 
providence of the Supreme God has made 
abject, with bodies bending down and 
prostrated to the earth, so that it may 
be und~rstood from this that they have 
no intercourse with heaven, fail to 
understand that man alone of all ani-
mals is heavenly and divine, whose body 
raised from the ground, elevated coun-
tenance, and upright position, goes in 
quest of its origin, and despisin~, as 
it were, the lowliness of the earth, 
reaches forth to that vvhich is on high, 
because he perceives that the highest 
good is to be sought in the highest 
place, and mindful of his condition 
in which God made him illustrious, 
looks toward his Maker?" 18. 
Another indication of immortality is that, since 
man c:.lone enjoys wisdom, which really is the knovJledge of 
God, the soul remains always because it seeks after and 
loves God. 
"Since therefore wisdom, ~hich is 
given to man alone, is nothing else but 
the kno~ledge of God, it is evident that 
the soul does not perish, nor undergo 
dissolution, bt1t tlwt it remains forever, 
because it seeks after and loves God, who 
is evetlasting, by the impulse of its 
very nature 9erceiving either from what 
source it has sprung, or to what it is 
about to return. 11 19. 
An argwnent vJhich to us may seem 8 little strange, 
and yet which Lactantius considered of "no slight proof", 
is that man alone makes use of fire, the heavenly element 
of life and light. Other creatures, because they are of 
earth and mortal, use water, the earthly and heavy 
element; but it is evident that man ~ho uses fire, par-
takes of an immortHl condition because the cause of life 
is familiar to him. 
11Moreover, it is no slight J)roof of 
immortality that man alone makes use of 
the heavenly element. For, since the 
nature of the world consists of two 
elements which are oprosed to one anoth-
er--fire and water--of which the one is 
assigned to the heaven, the other to the 
earth, the other living creatures, be-
cause they are of the earth and mortal, 
make use of fire, which is an element 
light, rising upward, and heavenly. 
But those thint~S which are weighty 
depress to aeath, and those which are 
light elevate to life; because life 
is on high, and death below. And as 
there cannot he light without fire, 
so there cannot be life without 
light. Therefore, fire is the element 
of light and life; from which it is evident 
that man who uses it is a partaker of an 
immortal condition, because that which 
causes life is familiar to him." 20. 
Virtue is likewise considered a great proof that 
souls are immortal. If virtue prohibited man from goods 
which he naturally desires and made him endure evils which 
he would naturally avoid, it would follow that virtue is 
an evil. B11t if virtue is not sn evil, and acts honour-
akly and discharges its duty in that it ~ravely despises 
wicked pleasures because it fears neither pain nor death, 
it is reasonable that it must be rewarded by some greater 
good than those things which it despised. After death 
what good can be expected other than immortality? 
"The gift of virtue also to man 
alone is great proof that souls are 
immortal. For this will not be in 
accordance with nature if the soul is 
extinguished; for it is injurious to 
this present life. For that earthly 
life, which we lead in common ·with 
dumb animals, both seeks !Jleasure, 
by the varied and agreeable fruits 
of which it is delighted, and avoids 
pain, the harshness of which, by 
its unpleasant sensations, injures 
the nature of living beings, and 
endeavors to lead them to death, 
which dissolves the living being. 
If, therefore, virtue both prohibits 
man from those goods which are natur-
ally desired, and impels him to endure 
evils which are naturally avoided, it 
follows that virtue is an evil, and 
opposed to nature; and he must nec-
essarily be judged foolish who _pur-
sues it, si~ce he injures himself both by 
avoiding present hoods, and by seeking 
equally evils, without hope of greater 
advantage. For when it is permitted us 
to enjoy the sweetest pleasures, should 
we not prefer to live in loneliness, in 
want, in contempt and iE'nominy, or not 
to live at all, but to be tormented 
with pain, and to die, when from these 
etils we should gain nothing to compen-
sate us for the pleasure which we have 
given up? But if virtue is not an 
evil, and acts honourably, inasmuch 
as it neither fears pain nor death, 
that it may discharge its duty, there-
fore it must obtain some greater ~;ood 
than those things are which it des-
rises. Bnt when death has been under-
gone, what rurther good can be hoped 
for exce_!!t immortality?" 21. 
The chief good, for Lactantius, therefore, is found 
in immortality, which pertains to no other aniMal. 
It cannot be attained, hovvever, without the virtue of 
knowledge, that is, without the knowledge of God and 
22. 
justice. He reasons that if this life which is 
short and full of labor is considered a great good, how 
much more to be de2ired is a life which has no end and is 
23. 
free from all evil. He says that reflection itself, 
vJeighing everythin0, leads us to that 11 excellenc and 
24. 
surpassing goodn, on account of which vJe were born. 
Lactantius reasons that virtue is set before us that 
lusts might be subdued, and the desire for earthly things 
overcome, until our souls, pure and victorious, may 
25. 
return to God, their original source. 
o:JOo 
According to Lactantius, a happy life has no 
existence either in the worship of the gods or in philos-
26. 
ophy. 'Je mt1st seek the highest good in the h.±:ghest 
place; and wha~_; is the highest but heaven, and God, 
27. 
from whom the soul has its origin? The chief good, 
therefore, cannot exist, "unless it be in that religion 
28 
and doctrine to which is annexed the hope of immortality." 
In bringing the third book to a close, Lactantius 
elor1uentl,y urges an obedient recer1tion oi' the true 
29. 
religion: 
"Let him who wishes to be wise and 
ha.9py bear the voice of God, learn right-
eousness, understand the mystery of his 
birth, despise human affairs, embrace 
divine things, that he may gain that 
chief good to which he was born." 30. 
The seventh and last book of the Divine Institutes 
has for its subject the happy life. Lactantius asks 
of what use is it to be either freed from false religions 
or to under stand the true one. "Of what avail to hold 
the worship of God with great difficulties, which is the 
t~eatest virtue, unless the divine reward of everlasting 
31. 
blessedness attends it?" He proposes in this book 
to prove that future things are to be preferred to the 
present, the heavenly to be 2referred to the earthly, and 
eternal things to those which are temporal because the 
· rewards of vices are temporal, but virtue has an eternal ~~--------' 
',.-
32. 
reward. 
Lactantius disagrees with Plato snd Aristotle in 
regard to the eternity of the world, "sirtce whatever is of 
a solid and heavy body, as it received a beginning at some 
33. 
time, so it must needs have an end." Lact antius 
reasons that whatever exists must at some time have had 
a beginning. :Ie says nothing can exist at all if it did 
34. 
not have a beginning. · Everything we can see must 
necessarily be material, and hence capable of dissolu-
35. 
tion. Lactantius says that it has been determined by 
God that this unrighteous age should come to &n end at 
the appointed time. All wickedness will be put out; but 
the righteous will be recalled to a happy life: 11 a quiet, 
tranquil, peaceful, in short, golden age, as the poets 
36. 
call it, should flourish, under the rule of God Himself." 
Man consists of two ~arts: the body, which is 
earthly, and the soul, which is heavenly. Likewise two 
lives have been asigned to man: a temporal life ·which is 
received at birth for the body, and an everlasting life 
for the soul which is attained by striving for it. Thus 
man does not enjoy immortali t,y without some difficulty. 
\fe receive the life of the body ignorantly; but the 
eternal life of the soul is received knowingly because it 
, is not given to nature, but to virtue, for God desired us 
~ 37. to procure life for ourselves in life. .---------J That is why He 
has given us this present life. We may either lose the 
true and eternal life by our vices, or win it by virtue. 
The chief end of life is not contained in this life because 
it will be destroyed by divine necessity even as it was 
given us by divine necessity. Hence, "that which has an 
end does not cont 8 in the chief t;ood. n . The true end is 
contained in the spiritual life we acquire by ourselves 
because it cannot contain evil or hnve an end. Immortal-
ity is not "the consequence of nature, but the reward and 
38. 
recompense of virtue." 
I~an does not ·walk upright at birth, but on all fours, 
in common with dumb animals. As he gains strength, 
man raises himself, is able to speak, and ceases to be 
a dumb animal. Lactantius says this argument teaches 
that man is mortal, but that afterwards he becomes immortal 
when he begins to live in conformity with the will of God, 
meaning by this, to follow justice which is comprised in 
the worship of God. ~his takes place, when man "purified 
in the heavenly laver, lays aside his infancy together 
with all the pmllution of his past life, and having 
received an increase of divine vi~or, becomes a perfect 
39. 
and complete man." 
God has set virtue before man, and although the 
soul and body are connected together, yet they are con-
trary and oppose one another. The things which are good 
for the soul are evil for the body, and vice versa. This 
temporal life, therefore, ought to be subject to the 
eternal life, just as the body is subject to the soul. 
If any prefer the life of the soul they must despise that 
of the body; nor will they in any way be able to strive 
after that v;hich is highest, unless they despise the 
things which are lowest. The one who prefers to live 
·well for eternity, will live badly or in discomfort for 
a time upon earth, that he may receive heavenly consola-
tion. Jut who prefers to live well here on earth, will 
40. 
live ill for eternity. He will be condemned by God 
to eternal punishment because he preferred earthly to 
heavenly goods. This is why God seeks to be worshipped 
and to be honoured by man as a Father, that he may have 
virtue and wisdom, which prodce immortality. God alone 
possesses immortality. Hence none other than He is able 
to confer it; and He \Jill grant it to pious men who have 
hohoured Him, as a reward to be blessed for all eternity 
41. 
and to be forever in the presence of God. 
The advantage o:C vices is immediate, even as the 
9leasures themselves are short and temporary; but that 
of virtue is future and everlasting. In this life there 
is no reward of virtue because virtue itself still 
exists; it never ends except by death and therefore, the 
42. 
reward of virtue is after death. In fact, even the 
desires of the body are temporal, that is, food, shelter, 
clothing, pleasure, et ceter~, and hence mortal; but the 
soul desires the worship of God and thus indic8tes that it 
is everlasting. From which it is credible that "the soul 
does not perish, but is separated from the body~ because 
the body can do nothing without the soul, but the soul 
43. 
can do many and great things without the body." 
And in concluding his last book, Lactantius 
earnestly exhorts all nto undertake wisdom together with 
true religion, the strength and office of which depends 
on this, that, despising earthly things and laying aside 
errors we formerly held ••••• we may be direct~d to the 
44. 
eternal rewards of the heavenly treasure." And he 
remarks how great a haDpiness it must be thought to with-
draw from earth and go to be with the Father who eives 
rest in place of labor, gives life for death, brightness 
for darkness, and in place of short and earthly goods, 
~ives us those which are eternal and heavenly. This 
reward can in no way be compared or equalled to the hard-
shi})S we endure in this world. Uod who saw the errors 
of men sent a Guide who might open to us the way of 
righteousness. Lactantius urges all to follow Him, since 
He alone has explained the true end which we all strive 
to reach, and has pointed out the road by which we may 
45. 
attain it. After death we can take nothing with us, 
except a well and innocently spent life, for whoever by 
his virtue has "trampled ur·on the corruptions of the 
earth, the Supreme and truth arbiter will raise him to life 
r-
46. 
and perpetual light." Lactantius therefore entreats 
all to 8pply themselves to righteousness, which alone will 
lead them to God. He urges everyone to serve God with an 
unwe arying service and engae":e· boldly v;i th the enemy (Sat an), 
that victorious over our conquered adversary, we may obtain 
from the Lord "that reward oi' valour which He Himself 
47. 
has ~·romised. n 
In concludin~ this chapter I cive Lactantius' con-
ception of the true end of life in what he himself called 
48. 
the "whole argument by a brief definitionn: 
"The whole world has been created for 
this purpose, that we may be born; we are 
born for this end, that we may acknowledge 
the Maker of the world and of ourselves -
God; we acJcnowledge Him for this end, that 
we may worship Him; we worshir; J:iim for this 
end, that we may receive immortality as the 
reward of our labo1.1rs, since the worship 
of God consists of the greatest labours; 
for this end vJe are rewarded with immor-
tality, that being made like to the 
angels, we may serve the Supreme Father 
and Lord for ever, and may be to all 
eternity a kingdom to God. This is the 
sum of all things.n 
Chapter VII 
Evaluation and Conclusion 
The coming of Christianity made a great dif:t'erence 
in _!lhilosophy. Back of Greek philosophy was always the 
problem of a ha~~y life. The outcome of philosophy, there-
fore, should be happiness. But it was Christianity that 
pointed out the way of salvation. This was what man long-
ed for. The philosopher's solution was open only to 
~hilosophers, but Christianity opened the way to happiness 
for every one. Men no longer had to search or pursue 
it, but happiness, salvation, was now given them. The 
condition of happiness was no longer acuteness of mind, 
but faith. Those who accepted this faith received a 
satisfying answer; and many of the early Christianswriters 
found Christianity so wonderful, so superior to philosophy, 
that they lost interest in speculative problems. nll 
that philosophy could offer was obtained in Christianity. 
Lactantius now had something much more important than 
philosophy; he was eager to spread the knowledge of this 
wonderful Gospel and to defend its truth. This, no 
doubt at least in part, explains the severity with which 
Lactantius discusses the end of life in various philosophers. 
But I do not think he overthrew philosophy as such. 
Learned in paga.lil.1.lore, he did not forget his knowledge 
when he became a Christian, but made it serve Christianity. 
There is no question but that Lactantius was a writer 
of no mean erudition and intelligence. He had a wide range. 
of knowledge, although at times he a~pears to be very super-
ficial and unfair in his statements. On the other hand, 
there is a sincerity and an earnest contention for what he 
felt to be true, that we cannot but admire. 
Concerning Lactantius as a critic of philosophy, I 
1. 
q_uote from one who has made a thorough study of this :r>roblem 
11 It is not a criticism of ph~losophy as philosophy that we 
often get, but a criticism of philosophy from the point of 
view of the philosophers character of religion. Tiherefore, 
in the fullest and strictest sense of the word, Lactantius 
2. 
is not a critic." 
Lactantius was raised up in an age which needed not 
only a Christian advocate, but an advocate in the person of 
a Christian scholar. Christianity had long been eng3ged in 
an unec~ual conflict with heathenism, ~:so far as human forces 
on both sides were concerned. Lactantius felt that there 
was a great deficiency of able teachers who might expose 
the 9ublic errors, and in an attractive manner defend the 
cause of truth. Perhaps he thought that by giving the 
defence of true religion a literary charm, many, even of its 
enemies, might be drawn to an examination of it and dis-
cover that true wisdom and true r~igion are conjoined. It 
is from this point of view that he ought to be judged. 
It has been said that "the history of philosophy is 
3. 
but a recital of a litany of so-called summum bonume.tr 
Lactantius was certain he pointed the way to true happiness, 
for his supreme end was God. Only in an infinite God can 
the infinite desires of man be satisfied. Man desires a 
happiness that is ~omplete, one in which every desire is 
fulfilled. 
The important c:uestions in 8 con~ideration of the end 
of life are, In what object or objects is this perfect or 
satisfying end found? And secondly, Jhat is the nature of 
this object or ~nd? We have seen that Lactantius answers 
the first question emphatically and repeatedly: the true 
end of life is immortality. 
"The one chief good, therefore, is 
immortality, for the reception of which we 
were originally formed and born. To this 
we direct our course; human nature regards 
this; to this virtue exalts us." 4. 
"Vihen death has beep. undergone, what 
ftuther good can lle hoped for except immor-
tality?" 5. 
"The whole world has been created for 
this purpose, that we may be born; we are 
born for this end, that we may acknowledge 
the Maker of the world and of ourselves -
God; we acknOYJledge Him for this end, that 
we may worshi.D Eim; we worship IIim for this 
end, that we may receive immortality as the 
reward of our labors, since the worship of 
God consists of the greatest labors." 6. 
But on the second question, that iE, ;[hat is the nature 
of immortality, Lactantius is very unsatisfactory. He does 
tell us that the end of life does not consist in any created 
good. "We are not born f'or thiR DUrpose, that we may see 
those things which are created, but that we may contemplate, 
fl · that is, behold with our mind, the Creator of all things 
7. 
Eirnself.n God alone possesses irmnortality and hence 
none other than lie is able to confer it. He will grant it 
to pious men uho have honored Him, as a reward to be 
blessed for all eternity and to be forever in the presence 
8. 
of God. He tells us further that immortality has no 
end and 
9. 
is free from all evil. It is not "the conse-
quence of nature, but the reward and recom1)ense of' virtue." 
He remarks hov~ great a hap;1ine s s it must be thought to 
withdraw from earth and go to be with the Father who gives 
rest in nlace ~f· leibor, gives life for death, brightness 
10 
for darkness, and in nlace of short and eartlly goods, gives 
us those which are eternal and heavenly. This reward can 
in no way be compared or e~ualled to the hardshi~s we endure 
11. 
in this world. In another place, Lactantius tells us 
that immortality is the reward of our labors •••• that being 
made like to angels, we may.serve the Supreme Father and 
Lord for ever, and may be to all eternity a kingdom to 
12. 
God." In his immortal state, rrwn vdll be wise and 
free from evil as God is. "Man, having received the 
garment of imrnortality, will be wise and free from evil, 
13. 
as God is." He tells us that God made the world for 
man's sake, and man for His own sake. Man alone has been 
so created that he can fellowship with God and dontemplate 
Him. 
"What more evident argwnent can be brought 
forward that God both made the world for the 
sake of man, and man for His own sake, than 
that he alone of all living creatures has been 
so formed that his eyes are directed towards 
heaven, his face lookin?~ towards God, his 
countenance is in fellowship with his Parent, 
so that God ap~ears, as it were, with out-
stretched hand to hAve raised msn from the 
ground, and to have elevated him to the con-
templation of Himself." 14. 
From the above we conclude that Lactantius merely de-
fends and insists ur1on the chief good as consisting in 
immortality. He gives _9roofs for immortality, without 
clearly defining it. His basis is divine authority and so 
the chief good cannot exist nunless it be in that religion 
and doctrine to which is annexed the hope of immortality." 
Arparently, since his work is an a:;olo{-;y for Christianity, 
giving a philosophical defense of its major tenets, he 
seems to be content v;i th insisting upon immortality, "for 
the reception of which we were originally formed and born", 
as a superior end of life to that of pagan philosophers, and 
makes no further attempt to explain the nature of immortality 
other than indicated above. 
In the meanin~ he atuanhes to it, how is immortality 
superior as an end of life to the end proposed by others and 
. . ~ 
rejected by Lactantius? We have found that various philos-
ophers had diverse and strange notions concerning the end 
of life. For some it consisted in wealth, for others in 
-, 
health, some held it to be honor, and still others, pleasure. 
But we note that all these are goods of the body. How 
could man himself rJe the end o:C the universe? He is but 
a particular beinp, ordered, like all others, in view of a 
su!Jerior end. Hence, the satisfaction and preservation of 
the body cannot constitue the su~reme good. In this res-
~1ect, then., Lact8ntius was right when he said, "The chief 
p,ood is not contained in this bodily life •••• that which has 
15. 
an end does not contain the chief eood." .And again, 
nMan •••• reaches forth to that which is on high, because he 
perceives that the highest good is to be sought in the 
highest place, and mindful of his condition in which God 
16. 
made him illustrious, looks toward his Haker." Then 
too, those whom Lactantius criticized placed perfect 
happiness in a created good; for him the final good was an 
uncreated good, God. nwe are not born ior this purpose, 
that we may see those things which are created, but that 
we may contemplate, that is, behold, with our mind, the 
17. 
Creator of all thin~s Himself." We would say that the 
end of man has to do with the whole of man, a !Jerfect good, 
fully satisfying and leaving nothing to be desired. On 
this point, however, Lactantius is ambip;uotls. He explicit-
ly speaks only of t~e soul as being immortal. "The soul 
does not perish, but is separated from the body, because 
the body can_do nothi:1g ·without the sou.l, but the soul can 
- 18. 
do many and great things withou.t the body." Again, 
l -
"Man consists of two parts, body and soul, of ~hich is the 
one earthly, the other heavenly, two lives have been assign-
ed to man: the one temporal, which is appointed for the body; 
the other everlasting, which belon~s to the soul •••• That 
earthly one is as the body, cmd therefore has an end; but 
this heavenly one is as the soul, and therefore has no 
19. 
limit." ~'le knovJ, hovJever, that immortality has not only 
to do with the soul, but also a sort of spiritualized body. 
After his resurrection our Lord had a body when he walked 
20. 
vvith the two men on the way to Emmatls; yet we know that 
He aD~eared in the midst of the disciples, "the doors being 
21. 
shut 11 • Be had a body, but evidently it was not subject 
to material limitations. Finally, Lactantius was superior 
to others in this regard, they followed their own reason 
and fleshly desire in determining the end of life, he based 
his on divine revelation. "We, therefore, are able to 
elicit the truth b.y more certain signs; for we have not 
collected it by doubtful surmise, but have known it by 
22. 
divine instruction." 
Lactantius realized and el0quently defend the thesis 
that the result of all philosophy when brought into relation 
with our true end of life fails utterly to satisfy the 
deeper needs and aspirations of man's spiritual nature. 
Our hearts thirst after ha~piness and completeness. This 
eager and fervent desire, no human wisdom can satiate. He 
finds the fundamental condition for the satisfaction of these 
desires, the true end of life, the highest good in the 
union of wisdom wit;~ religion, and its ultimate realization 
in immortality. 
., 
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